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Hans Morten HAUGEN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In  a short, but forcefid reply to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights,’ the Quaker United Nations Office/Friends World Committee for Consultation 
ended with the following statement: 
“Indeed it might be helpful to rethink the language used to describe IPRS and call them instead 
intellectual property privileges, which is what they are, and thus remove the possible 
confusion with human rights.”* 
The IPR Commission, established by the U.K. Department for International 
Development, also states: 
“. . . we prefer to regard IPRS as instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges 
on individuals solely for the purpose of contributing to the greater public good. The privilege 
is therefore a means to an end, and not an end in itself’’ (emphases added).3 
* Doctoral Research Fellow, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo, Norway, as part of 
the International Project on the Right to Food in Development. 
The author may be contacted at: chansmha@nchr.uio.no). 
I After the adoption of the resolution Intellectual Property Rights and Humati Rights, 17 August 2000, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/REs/2000/7, in which para. 15 requested the United Nations Secretary-General to submit a 
report, a letter was sent corn the Secretary-General on 6 March 2001 in which States, international organizations 
and non-governmental organizations were requested to provide information that would be relevant to the report. 
The information provided is made available in two reports: E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 of 14 June 2001; and 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12/Add.l of 3 July 2001. The information &om the Quaker United Nations Office is 
included in the latter report. The reports, together with the report ofthe High Commissioner (requested in para. 10 
of Resolution 2000/7), provided the basis for a new resoluuon by the Sub-Commission at that year’s session, 
Zntellecrual Property and Human Rights, 16 August 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/R~s/2001/21. That resolution also 
contained specific requests to the High Commissioner for Human Rights regarding intellectual property and 
human rights (para. 10, on an examination of compatibhty between patents and the protection and promotion of 
human rights; para. 11, on an analysis of the impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) on the rights of indigenous peoples; and para. 13, on an expert seminar to 
consider the human rights dimension of the TRIPS Agreement). However, these requests have not been 
fully implemented, as is explained in the document Intellectual Property and Hltntan Rights, 7 June 2002, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/41. There have been no subsequent resolutions adopted by the Sub-Commission on Human 
Rights, but the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has adopted a statement (E/C.12/2001/15 
of 14 December 2001; hereinafter, Statement) and is in the process of adopting a General Comment (No. 18) on 
intellectual property and human rights. 
2 Intellecrual Property Rights and Human Rights, 3 July 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12/Add.l, p. 17. 
3 Integrating Intellectual Property and Development Policy, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Department for International Development, London, September 2002, p. 6; available at: 
cwww.iprcommission.org. The Commission, moreover, writes with regard to the nature of intellectual property 
rights (IPRS) on p. 6: “In particular, there are no circumstances in whch the most fundamental human rights should 
be subordinated to the requirements of IP protection.” See also R.S. Crespi, Patents: A Basic Guide to Patenting in 
Biotechnology, Cambridge Studies in Biotechnology, Vol. 6 ,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1988, 
p. 21: “The concept is that the grant of a patent is a privilege rather than a basic right, and it must therefore be 
conformed to certain rules which are believed to be in the public interest.” 
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The present article will discuss this dminction between privileges and property 
rights, based on the evolving concepts of “privileges”, “property rights” and “human 
rights”. Based on an elaboration of these terms, it will analyse whether the term 
“privilege” is more appropriate than the term “right” in relation to intellectual property. 
Among the various categories of intellectual property rights (IPRs), it will particularly 
assess the role of patents. 
11. PRIVILEGES 
Initially, certain activities which also represented intellectual efforts were rewarded 
by privileges granted by the State. These privileges granted permission to conduct a 
certain activity. What these privileges actually constituted is subject to much debate. One 
author finds that the granting of privileges &d not imply any possibility for the holder of 
the privilege to exclude others.4 However, in 1577, the Canton ofBerne in Switzerland 
granted a “permanent exclusive privilege” to the inventor Zobell.5 This must be 
understood as the possibility to exclude others through administrative and legal means. 
Machlup finds that the privileges served different functions: 
“Some privilegcs granted protection against imitation and . . . thus creatcd monopoly rights. 
Others, however, granted protection from the restrictive regulations of guilds, and thus 
were designed to increase competition. In view of the latter type of privilege, patents 
have occasionally been credited with liberating industry from restrictive regulations by 
guilds . . . Royal patent privileges were sometimes conferred, not to grant exclusive rights, 
but to grant permission to do what was prohibited under existing rules.”6 
Therefore, privileges comprised both exclusive and permissive elements. While the 
privileges were obviously subject to instrumentalist concerns and not necessanly based 
on objective criteria, as is the case for current patent protection,7 the notion that 
privileges are “primitive”8 is a view that deserves at least more consideration. 
The English Statute of Monopolies of 1623 provides one example of how 
privileges were justified only if certain conditions were met.9 Article 1 states that “all 
grants ofmonopolies . . . are contrary to your majesty’s law”. However, Article 6(a) and (c) 
states that “the declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters patents 
See N. Pires de Carvalho, 7 h e  TRIPS Regime ofPatent Rights, 2nd edition, Kluwer Law International, Thc 
Hague, 2005. 
F. Machlup, A n  Economic Review ofthe Patent System: Patent Background A .  Economic and Historical Perspectives, 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights ofthe U.S. Senate Judiciary C o m t t e e ,  1958, Study No. 15, 
pp. 1-2, 2C-21, 44-45 and 76-80, at 1; available at: www.ipmaL.info/hosted-resources/unitl.doo (last accessed 
15 June 2005). 
Ibid., at pp. 1-2. 
industrial application (usefulness). 
’ The eligibility criteria for a grant of patent protection are novelty, inventive step (non-obviousness) and 
* Pires de Carvalho, supra, footnote 4, at p. 195. 
T h e  English Statute o f  Monopolies o f  1623, available at: cwww.ipmall.info/hosted-resources/lipa/patents/ 
Enghsh-Statutel623.pd6 (last accessed 9 July 2004). For the pre-1623 legislation in England, see S. Thorney et al. ,  
Terrell on the Law o f  Patents, 15th edltion, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000, pp. 2-4; and F. Machlup and 
E. Penrose, The Patent Controversy cf the Nineteenth Century, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 10, 1950, p. 2 
(findmg that the 1623 Statute “grew directly out of the system of royal privileges”). 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RIGHTS OR PRIVILEGES? 447 
[and] to the true and first inventor”. As mentioned above, there were no listed criteria 
to identify the “true and first inventor”. 
The Constitution of the United States used the term “rights”: “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respectful Writings and Discoveries.”’o However, 
these were not rights in the modem understanding of IPRS. First, this right represented 
no transferable right over the intellectual property. Second, this right did not imply that 
the right holder could freely choose not to exercise hidher right; rather, there was a 
strong presumption that this right should be exercised. In modern patent law, there are 
no obligations to “work” a patent. The original justification for granting exclusive rights 
implied that rights were given in order to “promote the progress”, not in order to 
restrict activities for this progress. 
While the distinction between a right and a privilege can be held to be 
fundamental, there are authors who have dscussed the boundaries between rights and 
privileges and have found that rights can also be referred to as privileges.11 This 
distinction between privileges and rights wdl not be pursued here but, as will be argued 
in Section IV, a right can only be understood in relation to a corresponding obligation. 
In summary, we see that privileges were granted by the State in order to serve given 
purposes. The privileges were upheld as long as it was felt that the original motivation 
was appropriately served. In other words, there was no “natural law” justification for 
these privileges but rather a strong instrumentalist purpose. In the field of copyrights, 
the justification was based more on moral arguments-in line with the principle later 
developed by Hegel regardmg the expression of the Self-and was less instrumentalist.12 
111. PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Machlup and Penrose have noted: 
“ ... those who started to use the word property in connection with inventions had a very 
definite purpose in mind they wanted to substitute a word with a respectable connotation, 
‘property’, for a word that had an unpleasant ring, ‘privilege’.”13 
Intellectual property is an intangible category of property with boundaries that are 
not always clear cut and which must be actively defended by the holder against 
infringements. The basis for constituting a property right in the field of patents is that 
to The Constitution ofthe United States, adopted 1787, US. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
1985, Article 1, Paragraph 8, Section 8. 
‘1 See D. Campbell and P. Thomas (eds.), Fundamental Legal Conceptions QS Applied injudicial Reasoning by Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfld,  Ashgate, Aldershot, U.K., 2001 (original edition: Yale University Press, New Haven, 1919); and 
J. Waldron, Introdrrction, in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories ofRights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 1984. 
‘2 See P. Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, Applied Legal Philosophy Series, Ashgate, Dartmouth, 
U.K., 1996. 
13 Machlup and Penrose, supra, footnote 9, at p. 16. They refer particularly to the French debate, in which 
the spirit was “against privileges and monopolies of any sort”. 
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one can describe a new and applicable knowledge of a technological nature, not merely 
a new idea. Tangble property is visible and documented, and the boundaries are more 
easily given than for intellectual property. 
A person who holds certain intellectual property will be able to defend this 
property only if he/she is granted a particular right over this property. In the field of 
patents, the rights are defined by the patent authorities based on what is defined in the 
patent claims. As with other property, one has to pay certain fees in order to have the 
property claim examined and determined. Unlike with other property rights, there is 
also an obligation to pay an annual maintenance fee in order to have a continuation of 
the right. Moreover, property rights over tangible property are indefinite, while IPRS are 
time-limited. 
In order to gain a proper understanding of this particular category of property 
rights, it is crucial to bear in mind that it involves a right over an abstract object-a right 
which extends to embodiments of this new knowledge in a physical object.14 
The development of the concept of property rights is not parallel for tangible 
property rights and for intangible property rights. The most important philosopher in 
the establishment and development of property rights is John Locke.15 At the time when 
Locke developed his well-known defense of the labour theory to just$ that man could 
claim property, there was no perception that the rights generated by patents actually 
constituted property rights.16 Therefore, the justification that Locke developed with 
regard to tangible property rights cannot be applied with regard to intangible property 
rights. However, contrary to this, Hughes finds that the justlfication of the labour theory 
applies particularly well to intellectual property.17 
Property rights developed in the 18th century as one of the core civil rights parallel 
to-and mutually reinforcing-the right to life and the right to liberty.18 However, it 
can be argued that property is not a natural right but rather a deliberate construction by 
society in order to secure protection against pressure from the collective.19 
Hence, property is justified as a foundation for liberty. As clearly proven by the 
Peruvian economist de Soto, property is an important asset for personal security, 
providing incentives for long-term investments, which are presumed to lead to 
14 P. Drahos, T h e  Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origins and Development, in World Intellectual 
Property Organization, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, W I ~ ,  Geneva, 1999, Publication No. 762(E). 
15 J. Locke, Two Treatises o fc i v i l  Government, Book ZZ, 1690, Chapter 5 on “Property”, in particular, paras. 25 
through 32. In brief, he argued that labour alters nature, and what has been taken out of nature through one’s labour 
must therefore lead to title, but with two important exceptions (“provisos”): first, there shall be enough left in the 
common; second, one can only claim so much property as one can make use of. 
16 Pires de Carvalho, supra, footnote 4, at pp. 14-15 writes: “This dramatic change [that rights could be 
transferred to third parties] can be detected in England and in France in the 1700s, probably inspired by the 
revolutionary notion that patents were property rights.” 
17 J. Hughes, The Philosophy oflntellectutal Property, 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 1988, pp. 297-300. 
l8 C.A. Reich, The New Property, Yale L.J., Vol. 73, 1964, p. 772. 
l9  Ibid., at pp. 771 and 778-779. 
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economic growth and poverty reduction.20 Unpredlctable property relationships 
impede economic growth. 
A problem related to unpredlctable property rights is the competition of property 
rights. It has been argued that, while tangible property rights easily cause conflict, as one 
person’s property claim may conflict with another person’s property claim, the same 
does not apply with regard to intangible property rights. It is held that “no patent can 
stop a person from continuing something he has done before”.21 In an ideal world, 
where patent claims only cover what is actually new and invented, this observation 
might be true. Thus, all known and existing processes and products would (in this ideal 
world) not infringe the patent. However, it seems too nake to believe that all activities 
can continue as before. 
At the least, the patent as an IPR may create some uncertainty with regard to which 
activities are acceptable and which activities might infiinge the patent. Most actors will 
have neither the insight to know nor the resources available to clarify--through 
administrative or judicial means-the boundaries between the intellectual property of 
the right holder and the public domain that is free for everyone to use. 
A granted patent right is considered to fall within the scope of “possessions” in 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. However, the European Court of Human Rights declined to 
give an opinion on whether a patent application constituted a possession within the 
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The European Commission of Human Rights 
had already made a dlstinction between a patent application, on the one hand, and a 
vahd patent, on the other hand, and the Court summarized the findings of the 
Commission by stating that “the company was denied a protected intellectual property 
right but was not deprived of its existing property”.22 Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that an intellectual property is not recognized as human rights-protected 
property per se before it is recognized through a grant by an administrative decision. This 
must be presumed to apply particularly to inventive intellectual efforts that are thought 
to be eligible for patent protection. 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS 
There is no generally agreed definition of human rights. One could attempt to 
define the term as follows: “The freedoms, immunities and benefits that, accordlng to 
modern values, all human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right in the 
societies in which they live.” 
20 H. de Soto, The Mystery .f Capital: W h y  Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, 
21 D.L. Richer and E. Simon, AgrEvo, in U. Lele, W. Lesser and G. Hontkotte-Wesseler (eds.), Intellectual 
22 British American Tobacco Ltd. v.  The  Netherlands, Application No. 19589/92, Decision of 20 November 
Basic Books, New York, 2000. 
Property Righhts in Agriculture, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 38, at p. 39. 
1995, Series A, No. 331-A, para. 73. 
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Human rights are universal, and the individual, alone or in community with others, 
should enjoy the same rights. However, as not all States are parties to all human rights 
conventions, in practice an indvidual in a State which has ratified all human rights 
conventions can claim more rights than an indwidual in a State which has not ratified 
the same conventions.23 
Human rights evolved from natural law and gradually became recognized 
nationally and then internationally, the latter in the second half of the 20th century.24 
Human rights have been given a high normative status, as agreed in the Vienna 
Declaration: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated. ”25 
It was seen above that the right to property is generally recognized as a human 
right,26 despite the fact that East-West tensions made it impossible to include a provision 
on property rights in either of the main human rights treaties from 1966: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights27 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.28 
However, authors’ rights-as a kind of intellectual property right-are recognized 
in Article 15.l(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: . . . (c) To benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary 
or artistic production of which he is the author.”29 
This right must be understood in relation to all other recognized human rights and 
cannot be exercised to the detriment of other human rights. The balancing of the rights 
is very evident in the Statement adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
23 However, it is also possible to claim that all recognized human rights are part of customary law and 
therefore applicable also in those States where the specific human rights treaty has not been ratified. 
*4 The establishment of the International Labour Organization in 1919 led to a substantial strengthening of 
economic rights internationally through the adoption of conventions in the 1920s and 1930s. Thesc conventions 
were arguably important for the strengthening of economic human rights, but it is not obvious that they actually 
are human rights conventions. 
25 Vienna Declaration and Programme ofAction, adopted 25 June 1993, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, para. 5. 
*6 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, rccognizes the human right to 
property in Article 17: “1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” 
27 U.N. Doc. A/REs/2200A (XXI), Annex of 16 December 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966), 999 United Nations Treaty Series 171, entered into force 23 March 1976. 
U.N. Doc. A/REs/2200 (XXI), Annex of 16 December 1966; 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 United Nations Treaty Series 3, entered into force 3 January 1976. 
29 Moreover, Article 27.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes authors’ rights: 
“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary 
or artistic production ofwhich he is the author.” P. Buck, Geistiges Eigentum und V5Jkerrecht: Beitrage des V8kerrecht 
zur Fortentwicklung des Schufzes von yeistigem Eigentum, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1994, p. 242, finds that the 
different wording of Articles 15.1(c) and 27.2 (“right to benefit from the protection” versus “right to the 
protection”) implies that the scope of the right is different. The latter is more explicit in stating that protection is 
the only way in which the authors can be ensured their moral and material interests. Hence, it can be said that the 
primary right under Article 15.l(c) is to enjoy the benefits, not to be grantedprotection. This difference in wording 
should not be exaggerated. 
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Cultural Rights in 2001.30 In a general observation on the relationship between 
intellectual property and human rights, the Committee states: 
‘ I . .  . any intellectual property regime that makes it more difficult for a State to comply with 
its core obligations in relation to health, food, education . . . is inconsistent with the legally 
binding obligations of the State party.”3* 
Moreover, the Committee has sought to clarifi the relationship between authors’ 
‘ I . .  . the scope of protection of the moral and material interests of the author provided for 
under Article 15 of the Covenant does not necessarily coincide with what is termed 
intellectual property rights . . .”32 
However, some find that human rights provisions actually imply that IPRS are 
recognized as human rights-even with fewer conditions than under standard patent 
law.33 It is reasoned here that this cannot be true and that the sparse wordmg of the human 
rights provisions cannot be used as an argument for any strengthening of IPRs. Rather, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides a delicate 
balance, implying that the moral and material interests of the author, as recognized in 
Article 15.1(c), are legitimate human rights only under certain specific conditions.34 
rights and IPRS: 
There are four arguments why authors of copyright-eligble productions, more 
than inventors of patent-eligible productions, should be considered to be protected by 
human rights: 
(i) the wordmg of Article 15.l(c) is taken from the Beme Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Article 2(1), applying the term 
“production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain”; 
(ii) the life-long protection of copyrights (Article 7(1) of the Berne Convention 
sets the term at “the life of the author and fifty years after his death”) is much 
more compatible with human rights than the instrumental period of patent 
protection of twenty years; 
30 The Committee was established in accordance with resolution E/REs/1985/17 and consists of eighteen 
members, acting independently of governments. The members are elected for four years and can be re-elected 
once. The examination of repom of State parties is the main activity of the Committee, and the adoption of 
statements and general comments serves “to suggest improvements in the reporring procedures and to stimulate the 
activities of the State parties, international organizations and specialized agencies”; U.N. Doc. E/1989/22, General 
Comment No. 1 (Introduction), para. 3, 87. 
31 See Statement, supra, footnote 1, para. 6. 
32 Ibid., para. 12. 
33 Pires de Carvalho, s y r u ,  footnote 4, at p. 242, Note 654, writes the following regarding Article 27.2 of the 
Universal Deciaration of Human Rights: “. . . protection is to be made available to creations (and discoveries in the 
sense of the Universal Declaration) without any discrimination as to the field of technology and science.” Based on 
this wrongful assumption, he also concludes, at p. 243: “. . . to protect the rights of inventors and authors is at least 
as relevant as to protect biodiversity.” For similar conclusions that IPRS are human rights, see K. Idris, Intellectual 
Property: A Power Tooljbr Economic Growth, WIPO Publication 888,2004, p. 241; see also Dieng, Inrroducrory Remarks, 
in WIPO, supra, footnote 14. 
34 The relevant rights recognized in the Covenant against which Article 15.l(c) must be balanced are Article 2.2 
(prohibition against discrimination), Article 7(a) (the right to remuneration for worken), Article 11 (the right to 
adequate food), Article 12 (the right to the highest attainable standard of health), Article 15.l(a) (the right to take 
part in cultural life) and Article 15.l(b) (the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications). 
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(iii) only those “intellectual rights” whch have their content close to human 
dignity should be recognized as human rights;35 and 
(iv) the travatrx prkparatoires of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights indcate that the drafters primanly thought of copyright-related 
work as f d n g  withn human rights protection; the term “patent” is used only 
once during the negotiations in the Third Committee of the General Assembly.36 
In conclusion, IPRS could constitute human rights in so far as the enjoyment of 
these rights contributes to secure the moral and/or material interests of the author 
(copyrights) or inventor (patents or industrial property rights) .37 
V. DISTINCTIONS AMONG HUMAN RIGHTS 
The third objection against considering patents as human rights, referred to in the 
previous Section, will now be analysed in more detail. As a basis for this analysis, it must 
be stressed that while IPRS might constitute human rights there is a distinction that must 
be made between rights linked directly to the human person and rights which 
contribute to the realization of other human rights. 
This analysis is not an attempt to build a hierarchy among ddferent human rights. 
All human rights must be based on the principles established at the World Conference 
of Human Rights: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated.”3* Moreover, it is obvious that, particularly among the human rights 
recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
realization of one right contributes directly to the realization of other human rights. This 
is especially so with the right to health, a right which is made more &ficult to enjoy if 
the right to adequate food or adequate housing is not realized.39 
35 See Preambular para. (b)(cc) of the German International Law Association’s Draft Declaration of 1993, 
Existing and Evolving Principles and Rules on Freedom of Knowledge, International Protection of Intellectual Property and 
Transfer $Achievements ofscience and Technology, presented through the International Law Association’s International 
Trade Law Committee but withdrawn in 1995. The full text of the Draft can be found in T. Oppermann, Geistiges 
Eigentum: Ein “Basic Human Right” des Allgemeinen V;lkerrechts, in A. Weber (ed.), Wifhrung und Wirtschnft-Das 
Geld im Recht. Festschrift Prc$ Dr. Hugo] .  Hahn z u m  70. Geburtstq, Nomos, Baden-Baden, Germany, 1997, at 
p. 455. The German Draft stated: “The texts [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights], however, do not rger to the protection of industrial property.“ 
(emphasis added). This writer disagrees that industrial property per se is excluded fiom the scope of Article 15.1(c). 
36 See Official Records of the 1957 negotiations in the General Assembly’s Third Committee, 
A/C.3/SR.798, para. 44, 184, when the USSR talked about “copyrights and patents” as not appropriate for 
inclusion in the paragraph. 
37 Whether Article 25.l(c) says that the protection of the rights ofthe inventor-through patents-hould be 
considered less important than the protection of the rights of the author-through copyrights-1s an unresolved 
issue. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights seems to inkcate that there is a 
distinction but does not make ths  distinction explicit. However, note para. 10 of Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/REs/ 
200112, c&ng for an examination of the compatibility between patents and the protection and promotion of 
human rights. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not indicate that there is such a 
distinction in its Statement, supra, footnote 1. 
38 Vienna Declaration, supra, footnote 25. 
39 The former Director-General of the World Health Organization, Gro Harlem Bmndtland, stated in 1998: 
“The major determinants of better health lie outside of the health system.” Health and Human Rights, Vol. 3, 
No. 21, p. 22. 
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There are certain human rights which should be valued precisely because they 
contribute to the enjoyment of-and form an integral part of-an adequate standard of 
living. These rights are the right of workers to adequate remuneration, as recognized in 
Article 7(a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 
right to property, as recognized in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; and the material aspect of authors’ rights, as recognized in Article 15.l(c) ofthe 
Covenant. These rights are not directly linked to the human person but are nonetheless 
of value, as they could form a necessary basis for the reahation of other human rights.40 
The moral and material interests of the authors of literary, artistic and scientific 
productions should therefore be recognized as human rights. However, the caution 
expressed in the (now withdrawn) German Draft on IPRS, saying that IPRS do not per se 
represent human rights, merits more attenti0n.4~ The following sentence therein was 
put in brackets: “Intellectual property rights are basic human property rights.”42 
However, neither the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights nor the 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has substantively 
challenged the perception that IPRS are human rights.43 
Concerning the enjoyment of the recognized human rights, it is an established 
principle that the enjoyment of one human right shall not negatively affect the enjoyment 
of other human rights.44 The challenge is to identifj under what circumstances the 
inconsistency principle of the Committee applies with regard to IPRs.~~ 
It is presumed that two conditions must be met if intellectual property protection 
is found to be inconsistent with human rights protection. Under such circumstances, 
authors’ rights-as rights which should be assessed based on the extent to which they 
contribute to the fulfillment of other human rights-should be enjoyed only so long as 
other basic human rights are not further impeded.46 
The first condition is that those primarily benefiting from the protection of moral 
and material interests are not human persons but, rather, corporate entities. The second 
condition is that those who are primanly bearing the burden of stronger protection of 
4o This is also the argument put forth by the Quakers; see supra, footnote 2: “The means of fulfilling human 
41 German International Law Association, supra, footnote 35. 
42 Ibid. The non-bracketed proposal of Part 11, Article 3, para. 1 of the Draft reads: “Results of intellectual 
activities give rise to basic human property rights.” 
43 Both have some reservations, however. The Sub-Commission states in para. 1 of resolution 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/REs/2000/7, supra, footnote 1, that Article 15.l(c) is a human right “subject to limitations in the 
public interests”. The Committee states, supra, footnote 1, that the scope of Article 15.l(c) “does not necessarily 
coincide with what is termed intellectual property rights”. 
44 O n  this balance and the consistency between Article 15.l(c) and the other rights recognized in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see A. Chapman, The Hirman Rights Impiicarions 
oflntellectud Propetly Protection, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 861, 2002, pp. 867-868. 
45 Refer to para. 6 of the Statement, supra, footnote 1, saying that “any intellectual property regime that makes 
it more difficult for a State to comply with its core obligations in relation to health, food, education . . . is 
inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party.” 
46 A problem with this approach is that the potentially positive impacts of intellectual property protection are 
not usually seen immediately but only after some period of time, resulting in increased creativity and innovation. 
These dynamic effects should also be considered, but this is not easy in a human rights assessment. 
rights obligations should not be confused with the human rights themselves.” 
454 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
moral and material interests are the less afRuent segments of society. This is because the 
most vulnerable and hsadvantaged segments of society are given particular attention in 
the supervision of the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.47 
Authors’ rights, as recognized in Article 15.1 (c) of the Covenant, can therefore be 
considered to be human rights, but only if the recognition, promotion and protection 
of these rights actually contribute to a better enjoyment of human rights, both for the 
author and for those enjoying the productions of the author. If social human rights, such 
as the right to food or health, are impeded as a result of the enjoyment of authors’ rights, 
the rights which are related to the protection of the human person per se must be 
considered more important than the rights which are related to the moral and material 
interests of that person.48 
Thus, there is a hstinction among human rights, more specifically between those 
rights which contribute to the realization of other rights and the rights which hrectly 
relate to the protection of the human person. While authors’ rights as recognized in 
Article 15.l(c) of the Covenant belong to the former category, it is obvious that any 
restriction of this right should only be made after careful consideration. In particular, the 
basic principle of non-discrimination, as well as the principles of participation, 
transparency and accountability, should be carefully observed. 
Finally, it cannot be excluded that the survival of a person may directly depend 
upon receiving benefits from hidher writing or inventions. In such situations, human 
rights protection of the author of artistic or scientific work is of crucial importance. 
VI. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN IPRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Based on the arguments above, the notion that IPRS are human rights should be 
qualified. The instrumental, short-term character of patent rights, in particular, implies 
that these rights are fundamentally different from the rights which all human beings are 
entitled to by birth and which are not granted by a public authority. 
Does this then justify the notion that patent rights first and foremost should be 
understood as privileges? The main difference in presenting the term “privileges” is that 
this was an instrument that was applied in the pre-capitalist era of mercantilism. During 
this period, the instrumental policy of the competing European States was to secure 
47 See Revised Guidelines Regarding the Form and Conterzts ofReports to be Submirted by State Parties under 
Articles 16 and 17 ofthe Internatiorral Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23,88-110, 
para. 2(a) under Article 11 of the Covenant, listing ten vulnerable groups. 
48 Article 60.5 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties implies that certain treaties are of a particular 
kind. The paragraph reads: “Paragraphs 1 to 3 [regarding termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as 
a consequence of its breach] do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained 
in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons 
protected by such treaties.” From the travaux priparatoires, it is clear that the term “treaties of a humanitarian 
character” also refers to human rights treaties. 
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certain benefits vis-d-vis other States. One such policy was the granting of privileges. In 
the modem era, the patent right is a right that a person is entitled to if certain objective 
criteria are met. However, there is no doubt that State authorities decide upon their 
patent laws based upon subjective assessments of what is most beneficial to them in 
social and economical terms. Hence, this modem patent system is based on certain 
standards of objectivity. 
It can easily be shown that patent rights are subject to specific conditions and 
limitations. As already mentioned, the term of protection is limited and subject to the 
annual payment of fees. Moreover, the rights are not absolute, as the State authorities 
can decide to issue a compulsory licence, allowing a person other than the patent holder 
to produce the patented product.49 The fact that a patent right is granted does not 
prevent the issue of a compulsory licence, provided that certain conditions, such as the 
payment of remuneration to the patent holder, are met. 
On the other hand, if the chscussion is at a higher level, the procedure for the grant 
and enforcement of patents inmcates that patent rights are of a particular kind. First, the 
right is granted by a public authority, such as a Patent Office. The Patent Office issues 
patents based only on those patent claims which are found to fulfil the eligibility criteria. 
Second, the issuance of a compulsory licence implies that the rights might be 
subordmate to specific public interests. Third, the patent does not entail full ownership 
of the invention, but is limited to its commercial exploitation. Anyone can undertake 
research on the patented invention. Fourth, a right is commonly perceived as a claim 
that one can make on the holder of the corresponding obligation, most commonly the 
State. However, it is the patent holder-and not the authorities-which is responsible 
for enforcing the rights in a situation of alleged infiingement. State authorities are only 
responsible for making available the mechanisms and institutions necessary for effective 
enforcement. 
Based on the arguments above, it is found that neither the “privilege” concept nor 
the “rights” concept is fully appropriate to describe the particular nature of a patent. The 
objective character of a patent clearly confhcts with the subjective character of a 
privilege. Moreover, at a more practical level, the older perception of patents in the 
form of privileges is not likely to be welcomed by the central actors; it is highly unlikely 
that any attempt to replace the term “intellectual property right” by “intellectual 
property privilege” wdl succeed. 
49 On the question as to whether compulsory licences are compatible with human rights even if the patent is 
recognized as a “possession” (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms), see Smith N i n e  and French Laboratories Ltd u.  The  Netherlands, Application No. 12633/87, 
Decision of 4 October 1990, in European Commission ofHuman Rights Decision and Reports No. 66, 70-81, at 79-80. 
The European Commission of Human Rights applied the provisions of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in a dispute regarding the granting of a compulsory 
licence. The Commission asked whether the control of the use of the property that the compulsory licence 
represented was “lawful, in accordance with the general interest and pursues a legitimate aim in a proportionate 
manner”. The Commission concluded that the compulsory licence pursued a legitimate aim of encouraging 
technological and economic development and that the part of the application referring to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
was “manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 of the @ropean] Convention”. 
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There are also certain common characteristics of a “right” which do not apply to 
the particular characteristics of a patent right, as shown above. While the patent right 
per 5e has an objective element, the strength of the right is highly subjective. The 
strength of the patent right is wholly dependent on how the rights of the right holder 
are exercised. While enjoyment of human rights is to some extent affected by the active 
involvement of the right holders, this requirement of active involvement applies even 
more so in the field of patent rights. For the effective exercise of the right, the patent 
right holder retains the sole responsibility to halt any alleged violation or infringement 
of this right-by bringing the case before adrmnistrative or legal competent bodies, 
alternatively through bilateral agreements or cross-licensing. 
VII. ANOTHER APPROACH TO PATENT RIGHTS 
A more appropriate understanding of what a patent entails comes closer to the 
perception of rights which involves power.50 A brief analysis of this concept of power 
applied to patent rights is the following. A patent right involves the ability to change 
legal arrangements, including the right to transfer a right to a licensee which operates 
with the consent of the patent holder. This must be considered as an undisputed 
characteristic of patent rights. 
Hence, the holder of the patent right has the power to define how and in relation 
to whom to exercise this right. The patent holder can freely decide that public 
non-commercial use or use by small-holders will not be subject to accusations of 
infringement, u d k e  commercial use by other corporate actors. The patent right holder 
can also decide to exercise the rights in a strict manner, filing court cases for alleged 
infringements based on available evidence. 
Therefore, it seems that power is heavily involved in the exercise of patent rights. 
Without power, including legal and financial capabilities, the patent holder would have 
&fficulties in exercising the granted rights, defending these rights from infringements. 
Based on this perception, the understanlng that patents primarily belong to 
international economic law and not to international human rights law is also more 
evident. This perception would probably be a better way forward to identify the 
potential threats of an excessive reliance upon patent rights, lscussing the conditions 
under which the granting of patent rights could lead to abuse of power. 
50 See Campbell and Thomas, supro, footnote 11, pp. 12-31; see also Waldron, supm, footnote 1 1 ,  p. 7. 
According to Hohfeld, there are four different categories of rights: rights as unrestricted actions (liberty, privilege 
or freedom); rights as claim-rights uts-d-uis the holder of the obligation; rights as power to alter existing legal 
arrangements (ability): and rights as immunity from legal change. This fourth category is not considered in detail 
here, but the following should be observed: A new patent granted must be considered as a legal change if this 
patent affects an original patent: however, no patent holder is immune from the grant of a patent for any 
subsequent invention which fulfils the eligibility requirements-even if the results are that the first patent loses its 
commercial value. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has demonstrated that no conceptual amendment can be expected 
where the term “privilege” is preferred to the term “right” in relation to intellectual 
property. The term “privilege” has too many negative connotations, which the 
advocates for intellectual property protection would be careful to avoid. 
At the same time, the term “right” as it is applied in the field of intellectual property 
is substantially different from the term “right” as applied in the field of human rights. 
The unfortunate attempts by the World Intellectual Property Organization to equate 
IPKS and human rights must be challenged. The nature of human rights is substantially 
different from the nature of IPRs-the former emphasizing provision and access, the 
latter emphasizing exclusion and control. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has taken upon itself this 
task of distinguishing human rights from IPRS in the drafting of a General Comment on 
Article 15.l(c) of the Covenant regarding the right of everyone to “benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author”. However, it remains to be seen whether 
the Committee decides to present other distinctions, in line with the Draft proposed by 
the German Chapter of the International Law Association. 
